Small kingdoms and crumbling organizations: Examining the variation in constituency party membership and resources by Fisher, J
1 1 
Small Kingdoms and Crumbling Organizations: 
Examining the Variation in Constituency Party Membership and Resources 
 
Justin Fisher (Brunel University) 
 
The ‘revisionist school’ of party campaigning in Britain has successfully 
demonstrated the importance of party members (see, for example, Denver and Hands, 
1997; Johnston and Pattie, 1995; and Seyd and Whiteley, 1992).  We have, however, 
much less information about the size and resources of local constituency parties.  This 
article reports data collected during the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s 
investigations into party finance.  The aim of the survey was to gain an impression of 
the resources and expenditure of local parties in a manner similar to the investigations 
undertaken during the Houghton Committee’s investigations in the 1970s.  The article 
then analyses predictors of local party strength. 
 
Data 
 
The Committee’s principal interests dictated the data collection.  The sample was a 
random stratified sample of 60 cases drawn from the 529 English constituencies. 
Constituencies were stratified by the following four characteristics: marginality of 
seat; region; type of seat; and winning party at the 1992 general election.  All cases 
were grouped according to these four characteristics, and 60 cases were then drawn 
using a systematic sample from a random start point.   
 
Questionnaires were sent to constituency party secretaries.  The valid response rate 
was exactly 50 per cent, though the response rate from Conservative constituency 
parties was far higher than for both Labour and the Liberal Democrats.  It was 
apparent from the responses that the post of constituency secretary is one held with 
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widely varying degrees of willing.  This is one of the explanations for the variable 
standard of questionnaire completion.  Indeed, some parties wrote to claim that 
somewhat straightforward information was simply untraceable.  Despite this, as Table 
1 illustrates, the responses match the population and sample profiles well.  
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TABLE 1 
 
COMPARISON OF POPULATION, SAMPLE AND RESPONSE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 Population Sample Con Lab Lib Dem 
 n % n % n % n % n % 
Marginal Seats 134 25 15 25 11 24 5 21 6 29 
Non-Marginal Seats 395 75 45 75 34 76 19 79 15 71 
South East 191 36 21 35 16 36 9 38 6 29 
Midlands 125 24 14 23 11 24 5 21 8 38 
North 162 31 20 33 14 31 8 33 6 29 
South West 51 10 5 8 4 9 2 8 1 5 
Borough 261 49 29 48 20 44 8 33 9 43 
County 268 51 31 52 25 56 16 67 12 57 
Con Seat 324 62 35 58 28 62 17 71 15 71 
Lab Seat 196 37 23 38 15 33 6 25 5 24 
Lib Dem Seat 9 2 2 3 2 4 1 4 1 5  
 
Total Cases 529 100 60 100 45 100 24 100 21 100 
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Membership Levels 
 
Table 2 gives the figures for the size of constituency parties between 1992 and 1997.  
The picture is a very mixed one.   
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TABLE 2 
 
PARTY MEMBERSHIP 
 
 n Mean StdDev Min Max 
 
Conservatives 
 
1992 32 1,045 946.2 8 3,953 
1993 33 967 853.4 6 3,345 
1994 34 878 794.4 6 3,022 
1995 38 826 755.5 11 2,611 
1996 39 843 688.3 18 2,500 
1997 43 809 711.1 15 2,838 
 
Labour 
 
1992 9 409 248.0 168 925 
1993 10 410 238.6 147 889 
1994 16 405 232.4 161 1,040 
1995 17 518 283.5 235 1,233 
1996 20 561 252.5 270 1,242 
1997 23 578 241.7 273 1,218 
 
Liberal Democrats  
 
1992 17 231 193.6 30 770 
1993 17 226 207.0 50 817 
1994 15 241 206.6 41 772 
1995 19 230 193.6 35 740 
1996 20 217 183.6 30 707 
1997 20 211 173.2 28 652 
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For the Conservatives, there is a clear pattern of decline. In 1992, the mean number of 
constituency party members was 1,045. By 1997 it was 809. Local Liberal Democrat 
membership also appears to have declined, though not to the same extent as the 
Conservatives.  Mean membership in 1992 was 231, whilst in 1997 it was 211. 
However, Labour's local membership increased during this period. In 1992, the mean 
membership was 409, whilst in 1997 it was 578. Moreover, the data also suggest that 
the increase in membership was particularly apparent after 1994. This pattern reflects 
the national picture whereby that the leadership of Blair (at least until 1997) had a 
positive impact upon the size of the membership (Seyd: 1998: 68).   
 
However, despite this decline, the Conservatives still have the larger constituency 
parties.  The largest Conservative constituency party in 1997 (2,838) was more than 
double the largest Labour constituency party, and was four times the size of the 
largest Liberal Democrat party.  And the average (mean) figure was 809, noticeably 
larger than the mean for Labour (578) and almost four times that of the Liberal 
Democrats (211).    
 
Yet these mean figures hide a considerable range.   In 1993 and 1994, one 
Conservative constituency party had only six members, whilst in 1992, one had 
almost 4,000.  The range of party sizes was far less pronounced for Labour – the 
lowest constituency party size recorded being 147, the highest 1,242 – but was still 
dramatic. The Liberal Democrats had the lowest dispersion of party sizes – the 
smallest party having 28 members, the largest 817 – but even here the largest party 
was almost 30 times the size of the smallest. 
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These figures compare well with the findings of Denver and Hands in 1997.
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  Using 
estimates of party membership by election agents rather than constituency secretaries, 
the comparable means for parties in English constituencies was 781, 616 and 173 for 
the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats respectively. In addition, the broad 
trends in membership are also borne out by studies from 1992 and 1997, although the 
decline in Conservative members (at least in English seats) does not appear to be as 
marked as that observed by Denver and Hands (1998: 78-9).  
 
The implications of these data are important.  Firstly, questions of political legitimacy 
must arise where a party has as few as six members in an entire constituency.  That 
party may stand no chance of winning the seat in question, but it would seem a matter 
of concern for a party to field a candidate in an area where it had such tiny support. 
Quite apart from the question of mounting a campaign with so few members, the 
small size inevitably means that the roles of members identified by Seyd and Whiteley 
and others can scarcely be fulfilled.  On the other hand, of course, some local parties 
are very strong in membership terms.  Nevertheless, the wide dispersion is likely to be 
of concern to parties. 
 
Income 
 
Party income is also a key variable in terms of organizational strength. Whilst 
volunteer members can fulfil many functions unpaid, parties require money to field 
candidates, campaign in and between elections and simply to maintain a presence in 
the community.  Local parties do not exist only at the times of elections, though they 
may be more visible at those times. Rather, parties attempt to maintain contact with 
the electorate throughout the various electoral cycles.  Moreover, significant party 
activity takes place before the formal campaign begins in order to maximize the 
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efficiency of the campaign effort (Denver and Hands, 1998: 80-1).  In effect, many 
parties are almost continually campaigning due to the staggered local elections 
throughout the general election cycle.  And for this, they need money. 
 
Table 3 shows the income of local constituency parties between 1992 and 1997, 
standardized at 1992 prices.  As with the figures for membership, it reveals very wide 
variations, both between and within the parties. 
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TABLE 3 
 
TOTAL PARTY INCOME  
 
 n Mean StdDev Min Max 
 £s  £s £s 
Conservatives   
 
1992 40 47,245 44462.6 550 228,521 
1993  41 36,315 37686.8 128 209,784 
1994  41 34,626 40527.1 206 219,631 
1995  44 32,028 40478.2 120 224,485 
1996  45 33,587 43967.3 779 240,055 
1997  45 33,713 38694.0 738 187,075 
 
Labour       
 
1992 13 7,289 6576.9 1,339 24,960 
1993  13 5,614 5694.2 829 22,913 
1994  16 4,473 4630.7 125 18,854 
1995  23 6,299 10168.2 608 46,485 
1996  24 7,826 9898.2 885 41,757 
1997  24 8,226 13309.3 744 58,800 
 
Liberal Democrats      
 
1992 17 4,911 5302.8 398 17,112 
1993  17 2,975 4126.1 176 15,992 
1994  18 3,003 4013.8 171 15,036 
1995  20 3,048 4435.6 102 16,985 
1996  21 3,830 5989.8 239 18,319 
1997  21 6,056 8760.4 385 24,164 
 
Note: All income standardized at 1992 Prices. 
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The Conservative Party is the wealthiest party at local level by some margin.  The 
average income of a Conservative constituency party in 1997 was more than double 
the average of both Labour and the Liberal Democrats combined.  However, local 
Conservative Parties are suffering a decline in income. Mean Conservative income 
fell from around £47,000 in 1992 to just under £34,000 in 1997.  Labour’s mean 
income in 1992 was just over £7,000, and whilst there was a mid-general election 
cycle dip, the 1997 mean had risen to just over £8,000. The Liberal Democrats 
experienced a similar cycle, with a mean income in 1992 of almost £5,000, reaching 
just over £6,000 in 1997.  
 
Yet the range of parties’ incomes is very broad.  The dispersion of Conservative local 
parties’ income is considerably wider than is the case for Labour or the Liberal 
Democrats.  It is clear that whilst there are some small kingdoms in evidence, there 
are also some paupers as well.  Again therefore, there must some question as to how 
well constituency parties can operate with such low incomes. Moreover, it would 
seem that the Conservative Party as a whole would benefit from a degree of cross-
subsidy. 
 
For all parties, and for each year, levels of individual membership are positively 
correlated with levels of income.
  
(The lowest correlation coefficient in any one year 
was 0.52, whilst the highest was 0.89; all coefficients were statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level, with all but one significant at the 0.01 level).  This may interpreted in 
two ways.  It could be that an increase in membership leads to an increase in income.  
Alternatively, however, it could be that the more wealthy and established constituency 
parties are more able to recruit members, since they will be likely to be more visible 
and may offer more opportunities for recruitment.  
11 11 
 
Moreover whilst all parties appear to benefit financially from larger memberships, the 
relationship varies between parties.  There is a stronger relationship for the Liberal 
Democrats than is the case for the other parties. For example, taking the mid-cycle 
year of 1995, the correlations were 0.59, 0.67 and 0.89 for the Conservatives, Labour 
and Liberal Democrats respectively.
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Expenditure 
 
Questions about the importance of expenditure reflect those of income, namely the 
functionality and legitimacy of parties that are unable to fund their activities. Of 
course, a wealthy party spending no money would fulfil few of its functions, but a 
party without any money is not able to spend it.  Table 4 provides figures for the 
expenditure of the parties between 1992 and 1997, again with all prices standardized 
at 1992 levels. 
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TABLE 4 
 
TOTAL PARTY EXPENDITURE 
 
 n Mean StdDev Min Max 
 £s £s £s 
Conservative   
 
1992 39 43,703 31967.2 1,050 105,427 
1993 40 34,737 27444.6 0 96,882 
1994 40 33,714 29089.8 144 101,487 
1995 43 29,636 29003.8 120 118,995 
1996 45 31,272 34496.4 495 161,531 
1997 45 31,306 30025.8 1,295 109,886 
 
Labour      
 
1992 13 9,269 9250.3 1,949 28,226 
1993 14 5,855 6911.5 602 27,476 
1994 15 4,490 4214.8 0 14,532 
1995 23 5,715 8534.1 573 37,674 
1996 24 7,475 10350.4 821 45,038 
1997 23 9,022 14146.9 471 60,570 
 
Liberal Democrats      
 
1992 16 5,454 5124.3 163 15,162 
1993 15 2,768 3828.7 68 14,308 
1994 16 3,206 4286.4 122 14,806 
1995 17 3,613 4471.6 188 15,433 
1996 19 3,608 5921.9 13 18,409 
1997 20 7,016 9205.8 459 24,164 
 
Note: All expenditure standardized at 1992 Prices. 
 
13 13 
The spending of Conservative local parties declined slightly after 1993, with a 
dramatic lowering of spending in the election year of 1997 relative to 1992.  The 
mean expenditure in 1992 was almost £44,000, but by 1997 it had fallen to just over 
£31,000.  The mean level of Labour spending also fell, but only very slightly (from 
£9,269 in 1992 to £9,022 in 1997).  In contrast, the level of Liberal Democrat 
spending increased during this period, rising from around £5,500 in 1992 to over 
£7,000 five years later.   
 
For all parties, the range of expenditure varied considerably.  One local Conservative 
party reported spending nothing in 1993; another spent only £120 in 1995. Yet one 
local Conservative party spent over £161,000 in 1996. There was also a wide range of 
expenditures for local Labour parties. One reported spending no money in one year, 
while another spent only £471 in 1997.  The same year saw another spend over 
£60,000.  For the Liberal Democrats, the range was between £13 spent by one party in 
1996 to £24,164 spent by another in 1997. 
 
For both Labour and the Liberal Democrats spending levels and dispersion reflected 
the general election cycle, suggesting that expenditure was far more differentiated at 
general elections. However, the general election cycle was not reflected in levels of 
Conservative spending (though this may be linked to falling membership and income 
over the period). Nor, however, was there any real pattern in the dispersion of 
expenditure.  This suggests that the overall, relative levels of Conservative parties’ 
expenditure changed little over the course of the cycle, which in turn suggests that 
party expenditures at general elections were less targeted than one might expect.  
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Overall, whilst Conservative spending fell, their constituency parties still spent 
considerably more than the other parties year on year. Clearly, this is a function of 
those parties generating more income, but the result is a clear disparity between the 
local parties’ ability to spend money year on year. This is significant, because whilst 
party spending is restricted during election campaigns, there is no restriction between 
campaigns. Parties do not enter campaigns from a base starting point; thus a party’s 
presence in the community will be cumulative. It might logically be argued therefore 
that expenditure levels both at and between elections would contribute to that 
presence (although at a national level, levels of year-on-year party spending have only 
a negligible effect upon levels of party popularity: see Fisher, 1999).  If that is the 
case, the Conservatives have a clear and substantial advantage over the other parties.  
In turn Labour has an advantage over the Liberal Democrats, though that advantage is 
neither as pronounced as that between Conservatives and Labour at this level, nor 
between Labour and the Liberal Democrats at national level. 
 
Influences on Party Strength 
 
This section of the article examines aggregate predictors of local party strength, with 
strength being defined in terms of membership, income and expenditure. Analyses 
using the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) data set are necessarily 
limited. The small sample size means that only bivariate analyses can reasonably be 
conducted and even then, the results should only be seen as broadly indicative. 
Nevertheless, the analyses do appear to display clear patterns that are worthy of note.  
However, the larger data set collected by Denver and Hands, which contains 
estimated levels of local party membership, allows us to analyse this variable more 
extensively. 
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Three sets of independent variables were selected, covering social, political and 
structural variables. The social variables selected were those commonly used to 
predict turnout (see for example Denver, 1998) as well as variables identified as being 
important by the party membership surveys (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley et 
al., 1994). These cover class composition, population density, car ownership, housing 
tenure, age and ethnicity, and are all derived from the 1991 census. 
 
The political variables concerned the electoral status of the constituencies. Three 
different variables were employed.  First, marginality was used for parties placed 
either first or second in that constituency at the previous election. This variable has 
been used successfully by Denver and Hands (1997, 1998) to predict strength of party 
election campaigns.  
 
However, in assessing party strength (as opposed to an election campaign), there is 
reason to suggest that this variable may not be wholly appropriate. The size of a party 
election campaign can change relatively easily depending upon the result of the 
previous election. If a seat becomes safe, it is relatively easy to downsize the 
subsequent campaign. With party organization, however, institutional inertia may 
mean that any change is more gradual and less responsive to individual election 
results. What is required, therefore are variables that measure a longer-term view of 
the likelihood of winning the seat. Two variables were used to capture this effect: an 
‘Index of Hope’, based upon position in elections from 1979 onwards, and a measure 
of the net change in marginality in the seat for parties placed first or second, again in 
the period since 1979.  
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The Index of Hope was calculated by giving scores to the first or second placed party 
in each constituency. That score diminished the further the election was from time t. 
This captures whether a party at least had a chance of winning a seat over a period of 
up to four general elections.  Thus, if a party had been in contention for a seat between 
1979 and 1987, but not in 1992, the likelihood would be that the party organization 
would decline less rapidly than the electoral support. Details regarding the scoring on 
the index are provided in the Appendix. 
 
The Index of Hope however, only captures party position, not the scale of victory or 
defeat. An additional variable was therefore calculated which captured the net change 
in the winning party’s margin of victory since 1979.  If the winning margin were 
declining, this would stimulate membership and expenditure for both incumbent and 
opposition. Conversely, if the margin was widening, the reverse might occur, at least 
for the opposition. Again, details of this variable’s construction are provided in the 
Appendix. 
 
Unfortunately, for both of these variables there have been two boundary reviews since 
1979, thus preventing exact comparison between different elections. This problem 
was addressed in the following way. The constituencies used for comparison in 1992, 
1987 and 1983 were those that have been the largest single constituency represented 
in the new (1997) constituency. The same process was employed for constituencies in 
1979.  This is not a wholly exact measure, but it does capture the fact that whilst 
boundaries may change, local organization may change less rapidly, and thus the 
political history of the area will continue to have some impact, even if the actual 
constituency boundary has changed. 
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The final set of variables was structural, and was designed to test the impact of 
boundary reorganization upon local parties. Two variables were used: the Boundary 
Change Index which represents the extent of change involved in the creation of the 
new constituency (Rallings and Thrasher, 1995); and an index of the number of local 
authorities represented within the constituency.  A higher Boundary Change Index 
together with a higher number of local authorities represented in a constituency 
should lead to greater disruption to the local party. This, in turn, should be reflected in 
its organizational strength. 
 
Membership 
  
Table 5 utilizes data collected by David Denver and Gordon Hands in their study of 
local party campaigning at the 1997 general election.  Whilst these data are restricted 
to estimates of party membership in 1997, they offer two advantages over the CSPL 
data.  First, the data cover Scotland and Wales in addition to England. Second, and 
more important, there are considerably more cases, permitting more detailed analysis 
of the data. That said, the following examinations were also run using the CSPL data.  
The results, although not reported here, bear out those found using the more extensive 
data set. 
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TABLE 5 
 
AGGREGATE CORRELATIONS WITH PARTY MEMBERSHIP 1997 
 
 Conservative Labour Liberal  
   Democrats 
 r p r p r p 
Political  
Index of Hope .547 ** .302 ** .720 ** 
Marginality 1992 .162 ** -.154 ** -.491 ** 
Change in Marginality 1979-1992 -.153 ** .070  -.049  
Structural  
Boundary Change Index .003  -.119 ** -.019  
Number of Local Authorities .187 ** -.196 ** .144 ** 
Social  
% Under 25s -.352 ** .322 ** -.315 ** 
% Households with car .515 ** -.442 ** .427 ** 
% Council Renters -.470 ** .135 ** -.437 ** 
% Owner Occupiers .361 ** -.268 ** .301 ** 
% Private Renters .154 ** .219 ** .232 ** 
% Economically Active .324 ** -.144 ** .259 ** 
% Manual -.478 ** -.092  -.459 ** 
% Non-Manual .489 ** .062  .461 ** 
% Professional & Managerial .556 ** .063  .519 ** 
% in Agriculture .349 ** -.326 ** .288 ** 
Persons per hectare -.256 ** .458 ** -.185 ** 
% White .150 ** -.478 ** .155 ** 
% Non White -.174 ** .485 ** -.179 ** 
 
n 406 443 397 
 
Note: **=p<0.01. 
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As Table 5 shows, at the bivariate level, political variables are linked to levels of local 
membership for all parties.  In the case of the Conservative Party, the Index of Hope 
is positively correlated and as one might expect, the change in marginality between 
1979 and 1992, is negatively correlated, which suggests that increasing competition 
over the period helped contribute to a growth in membership. On the other hand, 
marginality in the 1992 election is positively signed. This suggests that greater 
marginality in the short-term is not associated with higher membership.  Rather, 
Conservative parties are more populous where their current electoral position is 
stronger. For both Labour and the Liberal Democrats, the Index of Hope is also 
positively associated, as is greater marginality at the 1992 election. The latter 
indicates that in the short term at least, the current (in 1997) political circumstances of 
a constituency provided an incentive for higher Labour and Liberal Democrat 
memberships.  
 
Structural variables also have an impact for all parties. The number of local 
authorities represented in a constituency is positively related to both Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat local party memberships. This runs counter to the hypothesis that 
the greater diversity of political boundaries within a constituency would be 
detrimental to membership levels.  For Labour, however, the relationship is as 
hypothesized: the disruption of boundary changes and the higher representation of 
local authorities in parliamentary constituencies has a negative impact on Labour 
memberships. 
 
In terms of social variables, all those tested appear to have an association with 
Conservative membership consistent with what one might hypothesize. The 
proportion of young people is negatively associated.  Car ownership is positively 
20 20 
associated.  Private tenure is positively associated, whilst public tenure is negatively 
so.  Conservative parties flourish in areas of higher middle class composition.  
Agricultural employment and population density are associated consistently, so that 
Conservative memberships are higher is more rural and less densely populated areas. 
Finally, the proportion of non-whites is negatively associated with membership and 
vice versa. 
 
The social profile of Liberal Democrat seats is similar to that of the Conservatives. 
Thus, membership is positively associated with higher car ownership, private housing 
tenure, higher social class composition and higher proportions of people employed in 
agriculture; and it is negatively associated with young people, public housing, higher 
proportions of manual workers and non-whites and higher population density. 
 
However, the effect of social variables is not entirely as might be expected for local 
Labour parties. To be sure, larger proportions of the young and non-whites, higher 
population density, together with lower proportions of households with cars and 
persons employed in agriculture, all appear to be associated with higher levels of 
Labour membership. However, it is also worth noting that unlike the Conservatives, it 
is not the public/private housing dichotomy that is associated with membership.  
Rather it is ownership/non-ownership. In addition, at bivariate level, class as defined 
by occupation does not appear to impact upon membership. Only the proportion of 
economically active constituents (which would amongst other things, capture 
unemployment) is, as might be expected, negatively associated. 
 
Income 
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Given that party income is strongly related to the level of party members, it might be 
expected that aggregate associates of membership would also be those associated with 
income. Using the CSPL data, this is broadly the case.3  As far as political variables 
are concerned both Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties generate more income 
in areas of greater political strength. Moreover, for the Liberal Democrats, higher 
levels of marginality relative to the previous election are also strongly correlated with 
income, suggesting that local parties receive more money in marginal seats. For 
Labour, however, the association is counter-intuitive. The change over time in the size 
of the majority in the seat is significant, but positively correlated.  
 
Structural variables are only associated with party income in the case of Conservative 
parties. The number of local authorities with wards in the constituency is positively 
associated with income. This finding is not as expected. It was hypothesized that this 
would be an indicator of organizational disruption, which might be expected to have a 
detrimental effect upon party resources. However, it appears as though the reverse 
may be the case, although this does fit with the aggregate correlations generated from 
the Denver and Hands data. 
 
In terms of social variables, local Conservative parties generate most income in areas 
that one might expect; namely those with higher levels of economic activity, higher 
occupational class composition, higher proportions of owner occupancy, higher levels 
of car ownership and lower population density. Conversely, income is negatively 
correlated with higher proportions of manual workers and council tenants.  
 
Similarly, in the case of Labour, those variables correlated with party income are also 
generally associated with party membership. Thus, the higher the density of 
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population, proportion of younger people, private renters and non-whites, and the 
lower the level of car ownership and owner occupation, the higher the Labour party 
income. For the Liberal Democrats however, social variables have virtually no impact 
upon income. 
 
Expenditure 
 
Since expenditure relies upon income to an extent, there is again likely to be a similar 
range of variables associated with local party expenditure as there is with income. 
And indeed, that is broadly the case.4  Conservative parties spend more in wealthier 
and less populated areas, whilst Labour does the reverse. However, what are critical 
here are the ‘political’ variables, since we might expect spending to be strongly 
associated with the electoral status of the seat. In the case of the Conservatives, it 
appears that they spend most in the areas of greatest electoral strength, a pattern also 
discovered by Denver and Hands when examining local campaigns (1997: 256-7). 
This is also broadly true for Labour and the Liberal Democrats, however. That said, 
Liberal Democrat parties are unlike other parties in that they also spend more in 
marginal seats. 
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Notwithstanding the small sample used in most of the analyses, these aggregate 
correlations suggest certain key patterns. First, political variables are useful for 
analysing patterns in local parties, especially in the case of the Liberal Democrats. 
Moreover, the impact of political variables is both long- and short-term. Party strength 
is generally affected by both long-term status as incumbent or principal opponent, and 
by recent marginality.  
 
By contrast structural variables have a far less consistent impact. Moreover, what 
impact they have is unclear: at bivariate level at least, the impact of structural 
disruption is positive as well as negative, depending on the party.  Finally, social 
variables are useful in analysing patterns of local strength for the Conservative and 
Labour parties, but much less so in the case of the Liberal Democrats.  
 
Multivariate Analysis of Membership 
 
These bivariate analyses only provide a partial and indicative picture.  The larger 
number of cases in the Denver and Hands data allows for multivariate analysis, which 
was not practical using the CSPL data. Consequently, the relationship between the 
aggregate predictors and local membership was examined using OLS regression. The 
stepwise method was used, which helped alleviate any problems of multi-collinearity 
that can occur when there are a number of variables measuring similar phenomena.  
 
In addition to all of the variables analysed in Table 5, a dummy variable detailing 
region was also included. Table 6 illustrates that party membership varies by region 
(or nation in the case of Scotland and Wales). This in itself might not be a significant 
predictor of constituency party membership. In theoretical terms, for example, there is 
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little reason to suspect that those Liberal Democrat parties would tend to be more 
populous in East Anglia than those in the West Midlands, simply on account of the 
geography. However, there could potentially be an impact associated with regions that 
are areas of core support for the parties. Thus, if party membership in East Anglia 
were higher generally, there would be the potential for a 'neighbourhood' effect in the 
constituencies located there. In order to control for this situation, regions were divided 
into 'Core' or Non-Core' areas. The criterion was simply that regions with above 
average memberships were defined as 'core', and those with below average 
memberships, 'non-core'. Details of core and non-core areas are shown in Table 6. 
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TABLE 6 
 
CORE PARTY MEMBERSHIP AREAS 
 
 Conservative Labour Liberal 
   Democrat 
 Mean Core Mean Core Mean Core 
South East 1299 Y 524 N 254 Y 
East Anglia  963 Y 628 Y 198 Y 
Greater London 774 Y 930 Y 164 Y 
South West 1296 Y 513 N 376 Y 
West Midlands 511 N 495 N 118 N 
East Midlands  666 N 601 Y 85 N 
Yorkshire & Humberside  381 N 612 Y 99 N 
North West 388 N 625 Y 101 N 
North 341 N 662 Y 103 N 
Wales 425 N 582 N 104 N 
Scotland 488 N 385 N 101 N 
 
GB Mean 729  591  162 
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Membership of all parties is examined in Table 7.  In terms of political variables, the 
Index of Hope and Marginality from 1992 have a positive and significant effect on 
local Conservative memberships. Again, Conservative parties are strongest where 
they are already electorally strong.  Labour parties too, are more populous where they 
are electorally strong but unlike the Conservatives, also where the seats were more 
marginal following the 1992 election. Finally, it is political variables that best explain 
variations in Liberal Democrat membership. Liberal Democrat parties are most 
populous where they are already electorally successful and where the seats the more 
marginal following the 1992 general election. Indeed, marginality alone explained 30 
per cent of the variation at the first stage of this regression. Its strong explanatory 
power, relative to the other variables, is well illustrated by the beta weights. 
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TABLE 7 
 
OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP 1997 
 
 Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat 
 b beta t sig b beta t sig b beta t sig 
Constant -1389.108  -1.358  -218.230  -1.614 * 136.687  1.203 
Index of Hope 48.810 .211 3.629 *** 17.604 .251 3.225 *** 25.827 .215 2.555 *** 
Marginality 1992 11.696 .199 4.749 *** -3.795 -.180 -3.498 *** -9.205 -.542 -6.138 *** 
Change in Marginality 1979-1992 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Boundary Change Index -2.231 -.085 -2.180 ** -1.566 -.149 -2.947 *** - - - - 
Number of Local Authorities - - - - - - - - - - - - 
% Under 25s -126.847 -.171 -3.644 *** - - - - - - - - 
% Households with car - - - - - - - - - - - - 
% Council Renters - - - - 6.499 .216 3.398 *** - - - - 
% Owner Occupiers - - - - - - - - - - - - 
% Private Renters 31.344 .155 2.974 *** 14.624 .218 3.428 *** - - - - 
% Economically Active - - - - - - - - - - - - 
% Manual 23.909 .298 2.097 ** - - - - - - - - 
% Non-Manual - - - - 11.965 .400 5.391 *** - - - - 
% Professional & Managerial 39.312 .482 3.591 *** - - - - 6.116 .269 3.420 *** 
% in Agriculture 62.692 .169 3.599 *** - - - - - - - - 
Persons per hectare - - - - - - - - - - - - 
% White - - - - - - - - - - - - 
% Non White - - - - 4.345 .140 2.273 ** - - - - 
Core Area 369.698 .235 5.071 *** - - - - - - - - 
 
Adjusted r2 .517 .362 .392 
 
Notes: ***=p<0.01;  **=p<0.05;  *=p<0.1; -=not significant. 
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In terms of structural variables, the Boundary Change Index has a significant and negative 
effect on both Conservative and Labour parties. As hypothesized, increased boundary 
disruption appears to be to the detriment of party membership. It is worth noting, however, 
that boundary disruption had no statistically significant effect in the bivariate analyses of 
Conservative membership and thus it appears as though this variable is only influential when 
it interacts with the other variables in the regression. By way of contrast, structural variables 
have no significant impact upon Liberal Democrat membership. 
 
For social variables, higher proportions of professional and managerial staff, private renters, 
agricultural employees and lower proportions of young people have a significant effect on 
Conservative membership, findings that are consistent with the patterns observed in the 
bivariate analyses. However, in the multivariate analysis the proportion of manual workers is 
positively signed, a finding that is counter-intuitive and one that runs counter to the initial 
findings in the bivariate analysis. Finally, the influence of core geographical areas is 
confirmed, though the Conservatives are the only party for which this variable has a 
significant impact. Overall social variables have a stronger impact on Conservative party 
memberships than political and structural ones. 
 
For Labour, renting property from either the local authority or the private sector has a 
positive impact on local membership, and local parties also have higher memberships in 
areas where there is a higher proportion of non-whites. What is also significant however, is 
that the proportion of non-manual workers in a constituency is positively associated with 
Labour membership. This variable was not statistically significant in the bivariate analysis 
and thus it is only significant when it interacts with the other variables. The finding might 
appear to be somewhat counter-intuitive. However, there are at least two possible 
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explanations. First, at the individual level Seyd and Whiteley (1992: 33) found that the 
membership was far more middle-class (measured by occupation) than working-class.  
Second, studies of participation generally have frequently pointed to greater involvement by 
the middle classes. Whilst one cannot infer such patterns from these aggregate data, it may 
be a middle-class neighbourhood effect that produces this finding. On the other hand, given 
the similar counter-intuitive findings on Conservative memberships, it may be that the 
manual/non-manual measurement has outlived its usefulness for such analyses. Ironically, 
the proportion of non-manual workers in the constituency has the most explanatory power of 
all the independent variables. However, unlike the Conservatives, the Index of Hope has a 
stronger impact than all other social variables. 
 
For the Liberal Democrats, only one social variable - the proportion of professional and 
managerial workers in a constituency - has a significant and positive effect. Thus it would 
appear that aggregate patterns in the membership of the Liberal Democrats are unlike those 
of the other parties. There is little social basis beyond the professional and managerial class 
and membership levels are very much rooted in the opportunities for electoral success.  
 
Conclusion 
 
These analyses highlight a number of important patterns. First, Conservative constituency 
parties appear to be in some decline, though they are still generally far better financed than 
Labour or Liberal Democrat parties.  Second, there are very large variations in the size of 
parties.  Despite the large size of some, there are others with tiny memberships, some as low 
as six. This presents a real problem of credibility in such constituencies.  Third, the wide 
variations in income lead to equally wide variations in expenditure. Whilst election spending 
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is restricted at local level, routine expenditure is not, which theoretically may lead to 
cumulative distortions over time should the wide disparities continue. Fourth, individuals are 
very important to the finances of all parties; not only in terms of simple membership, but 
also in terms of the money they provide for the parties.  
 
Thus, it is clear that discussions of the disparities in parties’ wealth need to go beyond a 
simple focus on the national party.  Since local parties do matter these wide disparities are of 
importance. Thus, the Conservatives may be in decline, but there is still some way to go 
before there is financial parity with the other main parties.  
 
In addition, the likely impact of Committee on Standards in Public Life's (and now the 
government's) recommendations is of significance. The proposed increase in regulation will 
mean that local parties will be required to spend some effort in regulating their financial 
affairs. The evidence from this survey is that some constituency parties will be much better 
equipped than others. It was patently clear from the returns that such things as consistency or 
institutional memory with local parties is a key variable. Therefore, it will be a matter of 
some concern as to whether these additional regulations can be carried out successfully. Of 
course, one might argue that local parties adapted to the 1883 regulations that continue to 
govern election spending today (the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act), but these only apply 
at elections. More stringent regulation will be required on a more regular basis. The question 
then arises of whether we should expect more from local parties. If parties cannot organize 
themselves sufficiently well or be in some way representative by way of having an 
acceptable level of membership, then questions about the legitimacy of party candidates 
must surely arise. 
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The final point is that parties tend to be organizationally strong where they are already 
electorally strong. This is significant because since we know that local party campaigning 
matters, under existing electoral arrangements, this might be more likely to benefit 
incumbents over time. Of course, electoral change occurs, but the kind of local campaigns 
that are successful will have more difficulty in being mounted where the existing 
infrastructure is weak. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Calculation of Political and Structural Indices for Local Constituency Parties 
 
Index of Hope (1st or 2nd Placed Parties) 
 
1992  1st  (1987=4) (1983=3) (1979=2) 
  2nd (1987=2) (1983=1) (1979=0.5) 
 
1993-1997 1st (1992=5) (1987=4) (1983=3) (1979=2) 
  2nd (1992=3) (1987=2) (1983=1) (1979=0.5)  
 
Change in Marginality (1st and 2nd Placed Parties Only) 
 
1993-97 (maj92/maj87–1) (maj87/maj83–1) (maj83/maj79–1) 
 
1992  (maj87/maj83–1) (maj83/maj79–1) 
 
Boundary Change Index 
 
1995-97  1997 Index of Change 
 
Number of Local Authorities 
 
1995-1997 Number of Local Authorities with wards in constituency 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. The data were collected by David Denver and Gordon Hands. They surveyed Election Agents at 
the time of the 1997 general election and asked the following question: Roughly how many people 
are members of your constituency party/association?  I am very grateful to David Denver and 
Gordon Hands for providing me with these data. 
2. The correlations between constituency party membership and income for 1995 are typical for the 
whole period.  Whilst the strength of relationship for the Conservatives and for Labour varied 
slightly, both were always substantially weaker than the relationship for the Liberal Democrats. 
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3. Levels of party income were correlated with all aggregate variables in this article in each year for 
all parties. Details of the correlations are not reported in detail here. Full tables are, however, 
available from the author on request. 
4. Levels of party expenditure were correlated with all aggregate variables in this article in each year 
for all parties. Details of the correlations are not reported in detail here. Full tables are, however, 
available from the author on request. 
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